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Did the Affordable Care Act Contain Costs?
Abstract
While the Affordable Care Act (ACA) primarily focused on expanding coverage to many of the 46 million
uninsured Americans at the time, it included various provisions that sought to slow the growth of health
care spending. In an LDI Issue Brief two years ago, we looked at how the ACA provisions affected costs
through 2015. We found little evidence that they had produced the changes necessary to “bend the cost
curve,” although the double-digit growth rates of the 2000s had not returned. However, it is possible that
the ACA’s changes have had more cumulative effects. This brief updates our earlier piece, and assesses
the effects of the ACA on costs since its passage 10 years ago.
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Issue BRIEF
DID THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
CONTAIN COSTS?
A Ten-Year Look
Janet Weiner, PhD, MPH

The Affordable Care Act was designed to curb the growth of health care costs as it broadly expanded coverage. Through
provider payment reductions, alternative payment models, and a commission to enforce growth targets, the ACA sought
to rein in Medicare spending. Through a tax on high-cost employer plans and competition in individual marketplaces, it
sought to influence spending in the private market as well. But a number of provisions were never implemented, limiting
the ACA’s impact on costs. While statutory reductions in Medicare provider rates have slowed cost growth in Medicare,
they are not likely to be sustainable in the long term. Changing the trajectory of cost growth remains a challenge for
future reform efforts.

Figure 1. Growth in national health expenditures (NHE), gross domestic product (GDP),
and NHE as share of GDP, 1988-2018
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While the Affordable Care Act (ACA) primarily
focused on expanding coverage to many of the 46
million uninsured Americans at the time, it included
various provisions that sought to slow the growth of
health care spending.1 In an LDI Issue Brief two years
ago, we looked at how the ACA provisions affected
costs through 2015.2 We found little evidence that they
had produced the changes necessary to “bend the cost
curve,” although the double-digit growth rates of the
2000s had not returned. However, it is possible that the
ACA’s changes have had more cumulative effects. This
brief updates our earlier piece, and assesses the effects
of the ACA on costs since its passage 10 years ago.
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NATIONAL HEALTH CARE SPENDING
The growth of National Health Expenditures
(NHE) reflects both macroeconomic trends and
microeconomic factors. As shown in Figure 1, health
care spending has grown steadily over 30 years,
although it tends to slow in periods of recession.3
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Any analysis of the effects of the ACA on costs is complicated by the
factors that drive cost growth across time, including demographics,
price, utilization, and technology. A recent study modeled the
contribution of these factors to cost growth over time, and can help
frame our understanding of the ACA’s possible effects.4 For example,
while population growth and the age/sex mix of the population have
an effect, their contribution does not change in the short-term; instead,
short-term fluctuations are more readily explained by use and price of
health care services. In Figure 2, we can see the effects of the ACA
as large-scale coverage expansions began in 2014, as reflected in an
increasing contribution of use and intensity of services from 2014-2016.
We also see that medical prices explained more of the cost growth in
2017 and 2018, when coverage gains under the ACA stalled.

ACA’S EFFECT ON COST GROWTH
Here we review the cost containment provisions of the ACA and their
possible effects. The ACA included provisions to rein in Medicare costs
through mechanisms that could affect the unit price or utilization of
services. Some provisions produced savings statutorily by reducing provider
payment updates or adjusting Medicare Advantage (MA) payments
to private plans. There is no question that these provisions reduced cost
growth, although significant questions remain about their sustainability and
their ability to “bend the cost curve” in the long term.
Medicare provider payment updates. The ACA reduced annual
payment updates to most providers (other than physicians) by adjusting
for economy-wide productivity gains. CMS estimated that the provider
payment reductions produced federal savings of $85 billion between
2011-2016, savings that will continue to compound as long as the provisions
remain in effect.5 However, historically, the health sector has been unable
to improve productivity to the same extent as other industries. While
this provision is generating year-to-year savings, by most accounts, it is
unsustainable; if left unchecked, it will produce growing differentials with
private rates, threatening beneficiary access and provider bottom lines. An
economic simulation suggests that, by 2040, about 40% of hospitals, twothirds of skilled nursing facilities, and 80% of home health agencies would
have negative total facility margins.6
Medicare payment rates also have implications for Medicaid spending,
where many services have “upper pay limits” (UPLs) that cannot exceed
Medicare payment rates.7 As the differential between Medicare rates
and private rates grows, it will force a similar differential for Medicaid, as
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Figure 2. Factors accounting for growth in per capita national health
expenditures (NHE), selected calendar years 2004-18
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Notes: Medical price growth, which includes economywide and excess medical-specific
price growth (or changes in medical-specific prices in excess of economywide inflation),
is calculated using the chain-weighted NHE price deflator. “Residual use and intensity” is
calculated by removing the effects of population, age and sex factors, and price growth
from the nominal expenditure level.
Health Affairs, Health Spending Projections Through 2027. (February 2019).

Figure 3. Illustrative comparison of relative Medicare, Medicaid, and
private health insurance prices for inpatient hospital services under
current law
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Cost growth had slowed immediately prior to the ACA, which
complicates any analysis to pinpoint the law’s specific effects. Not
surprisingly, in 2014-2015, growth accelerated as millions of people
gained access to health insurance, likely reflecting pent-up demand for
care. Since then, as coverage stabilized, growth slowed substantially
from 2015-2017, and accelerated slightly in 2018.
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CMS Office of the Actuary, Projected Medicare Projected Medicare Expenditures under an
Illustrative Scenario with Alternative Payment Updates to Medicare Providers. (April 2019).
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Medicare Advantage rates. Another provision achieved Medicare
savings by cutting its capitated Medicare Advantage (MA) rates to private
plans over six years. Reductions to MA plans corrected longstanding
overpayments, estimated at 14% higher than equivalent beneficiaries in the
fee-for-service program.8 Despite concerns that these cuts would drive
plans or enrollees away from MA, its share of the Medicare population
grew from 19% in 2007 to 34% in 2017. Because of the ACA’s changes to
MA’s benchmark and bidding system, by 2017, enrollees in MA plans cost,
on average, the equivalent of fee-for-service enrollees, without noticeable
reductions in beneficiary access or quality of care.9 While CMS estimated
that these reductions in MA rates saved $68 billion through 2016, it is not
likely that MA payments rates can continue to be cut to achieve future
savings or affect the rate of growth.5
The Independent Payment Advisory Board. The ACA also included a
safety valve if Medicare per capita spending did not meet certain targets.
Exceeding these targets would trigger the institution of an Independent
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), a commission that would propose
reimbursement cuts if the five-year growth average in Medicare per capita
spending exceeded growth targets.10 IPAB was universally unpopular, never
formed, and formally repealed in 2018.11
Alternative payment models. The ACA also authorized market-based
reforms targeted to service utilization, to encourage greater efficiency and
higher quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. Most of these reforms
have been small-scale, often voluntary programs that were not intended to
produce large savings. These reforms shift risk to providers, with payments
tied to improved quality or reduced net cost. Evidence for many specific
models remains limited or mixed. So far, payment reforms such as bundled
payments and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) have yielded very
modest spending reductions for certain procedures and types of patients.12,13
Bundled payments put providers at financial risk for the total cost of care
for an episode of care, such as hip or knee replacements. Providers are
penalized for going over a benchmark price, and share in the savings for
coming under the target. Bundled payments do appear to modestly reduce
per-episode costs for many surgical procedures, saving about 1.6% for hip
and knee replacements, but no per-episode or overall savings for medical
conditions such as heart attacks or pneumonia.14,15
The most common ACO program, the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP) has more than 500 participating ACOs that cover over 11 million
lives.16 ACOs earn shared savings if they come in under a benchmark
annual growth rate. In 2010, the CBO estimated that ACOs would save a
net of $1.7 billion for the federal government between 2013 and 2016, but
a recent analysis suggests that after making shared savings payments and
considering program cost, the MSSP ACOs had a net cost of $384 million

IssueBRIEF

in that time.17 In 2017 and 2018, the MSSP achieved growing net savings,
with one estimate of more than $739 million in 2018.18 It is possible that
these trends will continue, as organizational and practice changes take hold.
However, the program was overhauled significantly in July 2019 and the
extent of future savings is unclear.19
Cadillac tax. While the ACA’s cost containment provisions primarily
targeted Medicare spending, it had elements that could have significantly
affected long-term cost growth in the private sector. The most prominent
was the “Cadillac Tax,” structured to impose a 40% excise tax on high-cost
employer-sponsored plans, beginning in 2018. The economic concept,
sound in theory, was to counteract the tax incentive toward high-cost
plans that drives overutilization of services. Although this provision had
the greatest potential to bend the cost curve over time, Congress delayed
implementation and finally repealed it in December 2019.20
Individual marketplaces. Other cost containment reforms in the
private market include the creation and regulation of individual market
exchanges.21 In theory, vibrant competition among plans could reduce the
very high costs in the individual market. However, few marketplaces have
attracted a sufficient number of plans to create the competition necessary
to significantly reduce costs. And in the larger context, only about 7% of
non-elderly people are in that market, limiting the potential of any individual
market reform to significantly affect cost growth.22

A TEN-YEAR LOOK
The ACA had many provisions designed to contain costs in both the
short and long term. Two of the most promising and direct provisions to
contain costs in the long term (IPAB and the Cadillac tax) have never
been implemented. It appears that the ACA has had some success in
slowing growth in Medicare costs (compared to private payers) through
statutory reductions in payments to Medicare Advantage plans, and
productivity adjustments that reduce annual provider payment updates.
From 2010-2018, per capita Medicare spending rose an average of 1.7%
annually, compared to 3.8% annually for private insurance.1 However, the
statutory reductions are not likely to be sustainable without significant
changes in practice that go far beyond the ACA’s ability to influence.
Although it does not appear that the ACA has “bent” the cost
curve, changes in payment updates and productivity factors may be
responsible for holding down growth in a post-recession recovery, at
a time of expanded coverage for more than 20 million people.23 That
is perhaps all we could have expected from the legislation, given its
implementation. Any further coverage expansions, and efforts toward
universal coverage, will need to focus also on sustainable and long-term
strategies to reduce the growth of health care costs.
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